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This is the usual paper by Valerie Ramey- insightful, careful, and with a clear message:
regardless of the methodology used, shocks to total government spending on goods and
services increase GDP, but at the cost of depressing private economic activity and private
employment.
Still, I disagree with this conclusion. In my view, the correct conclusion is: "Shocks to
defense expectations (in EVARs) and to defense government spending on goods and services
(in SVARs) lead to a decline in private GDP and employment. Shocks to non-defense
government spending on goods and services, on the other hand, have positive e⁄ects on
private GDP and private employment".
Ramey (2011b) argues that EVARs and the Blanchard-Perotti SVAR deliver the same
results because they essentially use two di⁄erent instruments for the only government spend-
ing variable that appears in these two speci￿cations, total government spending: "An SVAR
can always be interpreted as an instrumental variables (IV) regression. Viewed in this con-
text, the exercise I performed consists of comparing two instruments for total government
spending, the ￿rst instrument being the VAR shock to total government spending using a
Choleski decomposition and the second being the shock to the military date variable. De-
fense spending is not included in either VAR. In both VARs, I compare the response of
all variables when the peak rise in total government spending has been normalized to the
same number. Since there is no signi￿cant feedback of other variables to the news variable,
in essence I am simply comparing the e⁄ects of the same size increase in total government
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1spending on variables of interest, using two di⁄erent instruments for the same measure of
government spending." (Ramey 2011b p. 2)1
This argument is correct if defense and non-defense government spending have the same
e⁄ects. But if they do not - and surely this is not a crazy hypothesis - then both the EVAR
and the Blanchard - Perotti SVAR are misspeci￿ed: instead of total government spending, one
should have both defense and civilian government spending in the EVARs and the SVARs.
Now the "source" of the shock - whether to defense or non-defense spending - matters a great
deal. A shock to the defense news variable in the EVAR or to defense spending in the SVAR
is likely to be associated with a large response of defense spending, while a shock to non-
defense spending in a SVAR is likely to be associated with a large response of non-defense
spending. The fact that in all these cases one normalizes the total government response to 1
percent of GDP is useful to interpret the results but does not change the substance, because
to each of the two types of shocks there corresponds a di⁄erent "defense spending intensity"
of the response of total government spending. Of course, this all depends on whether we
can identify defense and non-defense shocks separately in a SVAR. I will show below that
we can, and that they give widely di⁄erent answers.
To this end, I estimate exactly the same EVAR and SVAR estimated by Ramey, except
that I have both the log of per capita defense spending and the log of per capita civilian
spending whenever she has the log of per capita total government spending. So I estimate
the reduced forms
Xt = A(L)Xt￿1 + Ut (1)
1Readers of Ramey (2011a) might be a bit puzzled by the approach and conclusions of the present
paper. The point of Ramey (2011a) was twofold. First, a Blanchard - Perotti SVAR, in which shocks to
total government spending are identi￿ed via a simple Choleski decomposition, leads to biased estimates of
impulse responses to total government spending shocks when there are anticipation e⁄ects. Suppose we live
in a neoclassical world, so that shocks to government spending on goods and services cause a decline in private
consumption and the real wage via a wealth e⁄ect; however, because changes to government spending are
often known in advance, SVARs tend to exhibit spurious positive responses of private consumption and the
real wage total government spending shocks (some might want to call these a typical neokeynesian results,
although so-called neokeynesian models deliver a bewildering array of responses depending on the speci￿c
assumptions). Second, EVARs are immune from this problem, and indeed they tend to show that private
consumption and the real wage fall in response to defense news shocks (the neoclassical response).
In the present paper, these di⁄erences between EVARs and SVARs have disappeared. Ramey reaches the
same conclusion as Perotti (2011), namely that, when estimated on the same sample and in response to
the same types of shocks (to be de￿ned more precisely below) EVARs and SVARs give essentially the same
answers. Hence, in these comments I will not dwell much on the question of whether SVARs shocks do
capture something structural, an issue I discuss in Perotti (2011). Given that SVARs have the same status
as EVARs in the present paper (and indeed in the last section Ramey tests an hypothesis using only a
SVAR), I will consider myself authorized to treat SVARs as meaningful objects.
2where in the EVAR case the vector Xt includes the defense news variable, the log of defense
spending on goods and services, the log of civilian government spending on goods and ser-
vices, the log of private GDP (all three last variables a are in real, per capita terms), the
Barro-Redlick average margined tax rate, the 3 months interest rate, the log of government
employments, and the log of private employment. In the SVAR case, the vector Xt includes
the same variables except that the defense news variable is omitted. The regressions are in
levels, with four lags or each variable, a constant and linear and quadratic trends in each
equation. All the data were kindly provided by Valerie Ramey.
In the SVAR, it is meaningful to talk about defense and civilian government spending
shocks only if the reduced form residuals of the defense and civilian government spending
equations are nearly uncorrelated, so that the ordering of the two variables in a Choleski
decomposition does not matter. Empirically, this is indeed the case. As a convention, when
I present the response to a shock that variable is ordered ￿rst, but the opposite ordering
gives virtually identical results.
For brevity, I will focus on the sample starting in 1947:1. Although the analysis of
WWII is insightful and interesting as usual, most researchers would be unconvinced by any
conclusion based on that period. WWII was obviously by far the largest shock to defense
spending and total spending in the sample (and probably in the history of the United States).
It could be a great experiment in ￿scal policy. Unfortunately, it was also accompanied
by things like price controls, production controls, rationing, the draft, and patriotism: to
disentangle the role of these factors on variables like labor supply, the real wage, private
consumption, and private investment is impossible. For example, Hall (2009) argues that the
combined e⁄ect of these factors on GDP and labor supply was probably negative; Barro -
Redlick (2011) argue that it was probably positive. Unfortunately, as they openly recognize,
their conclusions are based exclusively on intuition.
However, given the extensive production controls and rationing, it is hard to see how
consumption of goods and some components of private investment could go anywhere but
down.2 It is interesting to note that, as I show in Perotti (2011), the consumption of services,
2In addition, there are accounting issues that can explain the decline in investment and consumption.
As Gordon and Krenn (2010, p. 11) argue, the war and its preparation mechanically reduced private
consumotion of non durables, as recorded in the national income accounts, "since it excludes the food and
clothing provided to the 10 percent of the population that served in the military, as these were counted as
government rather than consumption expenditures." Similar accounting issues arise with private investment,
another item that displays a decline in teh EVAR responses: "Yet much of this new investment in plant and
equipment was not counted as investment in the national accounts.[....] [T]he ongoing attempt to double
plant capacity was being ￿nanced by the government, not by the company￿ s own funds [...] Since investment
in war-related plant expansion was counted as government spending rather than private investment in the
national accounts, the surge of war-related investment during 1941 occurred simultaneously with a decline
3that were not subject to rationing, increased instead during WWII. For all these reasons, I
will focus on the post-WWII period.
Column 1 Figure 1 displays the median (out of 1000 bootstrap replications) responses
to the defense news shock in an EVAR in the sample starting in 1947:1. The responses of
national income aggregates are expressed as percentage points of total GDP by multiplying
the log responses by the average share of that variable in GDP. Similarly, the responses of the
employment variables are expressed as percentage points of total employment. All responses
are normalized so that the peak response of total government spending (the sum of defense
and civilian purchases of goods and services) is 1 percent of total GDP. 95 percent standard
error bands are displayed.
Obviously the responses of column 1 are virtually identical to those reported by Ramey
in her Figures 3, 6 and 14: private GDP and private employment fall. Note, however, an
important feature of these responses that could not be detected in the Ramey speci￿cation:
defense spending increases, but civilian spending falls; hence, if the two types of government
spending have di⁄erent e⁄ects, this is not really a clean experiment. The response of pri-
vate employment is ￿ at; government employment increases, but, not surprisingly, it is only
military employment that increases: civilian government employment is ￿ at.3
Column 2 of Figure 1 checks the robustness of these results to one key quarter, 1950:3,
when the defense news variable takes a value of 63 percent of GDP, the largest value during
the Korean war. The next largest revisions during the Korean war were 41 percent in 1950:4,
and then -2.02 percent in 1953:1 and -3.06 percent in 1953:3; the next largest revision
in the post-Korean war sample is 6.4 percent in 1980:1. Column 2 shows that omitting
1950:34 causes the standard errors to increase drastically. The response of private GDP is
now insigni￿cant; only the response of military employment remains signi￿cant. Of course,
whether one wants to discard any information is largely a philosophical question which will
never be solved; still, it is important for the reader to be aware to what extent the results
of the defense news EVAR depend on just one quarter of the sample.
Now turn to the SVAR responses. As it turns out, they are very robust to the exclusion
of 1950:3. For brevity, I will focus on the sample with 1950:3 excluded. Column 3 displays
responses to a defense spending shock. Note that this is a "pure" defense shock: the response
of civilian spending is ￿ at at all horizons. All responses are virtually identical to the responses
to a defense news shock in the EVAR: private GDP falls, government employment increases
in measured private investment in the last half of 1941".
3The responses of civiolian and military government employment are obtained from speci￿cations in which
each of these two variables replaces the government employment variable in turn.
4In practice, this is achieved by including a dummy variable for 1950:3 and its four lags.
4but only because of an increase in military employment. Now both private employment and
the short-term interest rate fall signi￿cantly, while their response was insigni￿cant in the
EVAR case. The Barro-Redlick tax rate also falls after several quarters.
Column 4 displays the responses to a civilian government spending shock. Note that
this too is a "pure" shock: the response of defense spending is ￿ at at all horizons. The
responses are almost symmetrical relative to those in column 3. Private GDP increases by
about two percentage points of total GDP, and private employment increases, even though
the standard errors are larger. Of course, government employment also increases; but now
obviously it is civilian government employment that increases.
The short-term interest rate and the Barro-Redlick tax rate increases in response to
civilian spending shocks; in contrast, they decline in response to defense spending shocks.
To the extent that these are policy variables, one must conclude that civilian spending shocks
have positive e⁄ects on private activity despite the "unfavourable" monetary and tax policies
that accompany them.
Column 1 of Figure 2 displays the median di⁄erence, out of 1000 replications, between
the EVAR responses and the SVAR responses to a defense news shock. As it was obvious
even from a visual inspection of the impulse responses, these di⁄erences are minimal, and
never statistical signi￿cant. Column 2 displays the median di⁄erence or the response be-
tween SVAR shocks to non-defense spending and SVAR shocks to defense spending. These
di⁄erences are large, and statistically signi￿cant.
In conclusion, the evidence suggests that shocks to defense spending on goods and services
have diametrically opposite e⁄ects to shocks to civilian spending on goods and services,
despite the fact that the latter were on average associated with stricter monetary and tax
policies. Ramey￿ s conclusions are based on the e⁄ects of defense spending shocks; they
would have been the opposite if she had looked at non-defense spending shocks. Defense
spending shocks display the typical neoclassical features of ￿scal policy; non-defense shocks
display what some might weant to call keyensian features.
In these comments, I have just presented the facts; I do not have a rigorous explanation.
But I believe these results are relevant not only from a theoretical perspective. They are
relevant also for the policy debate in the US; and they are of interest for non US coun-
tries, where defense spending is a much smaller part of total government spending, and has
exhibited smaller variation over time.
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